


































































　Organizational economics has made the following contributions to economic analysis: (1) it has enabled the analysis of the features and 
functions of firms that are regarded as “black boxes” in neoclassical economics; (2) it has enabled the comparison of firms and markets 
as governance mechanisms for resource allocation. As a result, analyses of franchise systems have been developing. Organizational 
economics consists of transaction cost economics, agency theory, and property rights theory. Transaction cost economics has shown that 
by using the concept of asset specificity, hybrid organizations including franchise systems might be selected as an efficient governance 
mechanism. However, transaction cost economics has not presented verifiable hypotheses concerning the above assertion. Although 
agency theory has presented hypotheses on franchise organizations and contributed to the generation of many empirical analyses, it has 
not successfully explained the reason why franchise systems are selected as an efficient governance mechanism. Applications of property 
rights theory to franchise systems are still premature. However, the theory of franchise systems based on organizational economics is 




Department of Regional Cultural Policy and Management, Faculty of Cultural Policy and Management
組織の経済学とフランチャイズ・システム






































































































































































































































































































































































































（Caves and Murphy, 1976）。ブランド力を高める上
統治構造
市場 中間組織 企業組織
インセンティブの強さ ++ + 0
管理コントロール 0 + ++
価格メカニズムによる適応 ++ + 0
協調による適応 0 + ++
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